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Abstract
The process of wage determination is mediated by the institutional framework of
the labor market. Bargaining systems differ not only in their mode of govern-
ance, but also in the way that wages are related to unemployment, inflation, and
productivity growth. Based on annual data for the period 1971–1996 from 20
OECD countries, the paper uses a pooled time-series cross-section model to show
that bargaining modes affect the speed at which wages are adjusted and the ex-
tent to which macroeconomic factors affect wages. Contrary to the expectations
of mainstream economics, uncoordinated bargaining does not turn out to be the
most flexible mode. Pattern setting and peak-level coordination, if legally en-
forceable, are modes of labor market governance that are at least as flexible and
responsive, if not more so. Hence these labor market institutions cannot be
blamed for excessive rigidity.
Zusammenfassung
Der Lohnfindungsprozess ist abhängig von den institutionellen Rahmenbedin-
gungen des Arbeitsmarktes. Lohnverhandlungssysteme unterscheiden sich nicht
nur hinsichtlich der Interaktionsformen ihrer Akteure, sondern auch hinsichtlich
der Art, wie Löhne auf Arbeitslosigkeit, Inflation und Produktivitätswachstum
reagieren. Auf der Basis von jährlichen Daten von 20 OECD-Staaten für die Peri-
ode 1971–1996 zeigt der Aufsatz mit Hilfe einer Panel-Analyse, dass der Lohn-
verhandlungsmodus sowohl die Anpassungsgeschwindingkeit der Löhne als
auch das Ausmaß des Effekts makroökonomischer Faktoren auf die Löhne beein-
flusst. Im Gegensatz zur gängigen ökonomischen Erwartungen zeigt sich das
nicht-koordinierte Lohnverhandlungssystem nicht als der flexibelste Modus. So-
wohl Lohnführerschaft als auch dachverbandliche Koordinierung auf der Basis
hoher Regierbarkeit führen zu mindestens ebenso oder flexibleren Anpassungs-
leistungen des Arbeitsmarktes. Hieraus folgt, dass diese Arbeitsmarktinstitutio-
nen nicht als Ursachen exzessiver Rigidität herangezogen werden können.
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1 Introduction1
Labor market institutions have been the focus of intense debate in comparative
political economy. Wage restraint as a mechanism for improving international
competitiveness has been on the agenda of industrial relations for a long time in
many OECD countries. “During the 1960s […] and especially during the 1970s,
moderation of real wages was urged on the grounds that it was necessary to in-
crease or restore international competitiveness and profitability […]” (Flanagan et
al. 1983: 29), although the extent to which countries have been able to attain this
goal has varied. Needless to say, this concern further increased during the 1980s
and 1990s (see, e.g., Dore et al. 1994). In consequence, “labour economics and the
institutions and rules that govern labour markets have moved from the periphery
to the centre of economic discourse” (Freeman 1998: 3).
Comparative studies attempting to explain differences in macroeconomic per-
formance by the institutional framework of the labor market, in particular wage
bargaining institutions, have become a veritable boom industry. In political econ-
omy, quantitative research designs based on increasingly sophisticated opera-
tionalizations and statistical techniques have obtained varying results, depending
on the conceptualization of the dependent and independent variables, the model
specification, the countries included, the time period covered, and also the choice
of method (e.g., Calmfors/Driffill 1988; Golden 1993; Hall/Franzese 1998;
Iversen 1999). Although most of them agree that wage coordination improves the
ability of countries to cope with economic problems, other studies tend to suggest
that decentralized and deregulated labor markets actually perform better (see,
e.g., Siebert 1997). Recent critical appraisals have found that the evidence pro-
vided by both research traditions is not convincing (OECD 1997; Flanagan 1999).
In particular, effects are highly dependent on framework conditions, notably on
                                                  
1 Acknowledgments: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fifth Inter-
national Conference on Logic and Methodology of the International Sociological As-
sociation, October 3–6, 2000, Zentralarchiv, University of Cologne and at the Confer-
ence on Internationalization and Democracy, November 17–18, 2000, Zentrum für
Überfakuläre Forschung, University of Vienna. It is based on a MA thesis accepted at
the Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis. I would like to thank the
Summer School, in particular Elinor Scarbrough, for help and encouragement. Simon
Price, Ron Smith, Henrik Enderlein, and two referees have provided helpful sugges-
tions on how to improve the paper. I would also like to thank Badi Baltagi for dis-
cussing the complexities of the panel structure in this data set with me. The data stem
from the Internationalisation, Labour Relations, Competitiveness (ILC) project
funded by the Austrian Science Fund and by the Austrian Ministry of Science and
Transport. My thanks go to Franz Traxler for allowing me to use the data and for his
comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
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the interaction between external shocks and institutions (Blanchard/Wolfers
2000). Further, conditionalities and complexities within labor market institutions
should also be taken into account (Kittel 2000).
Notwithstanding the many insights gained from these studies, two important as-
pects have been neglected. The first concerns the choice of the dependent vari-
able. Most studies have focused on the effect that wage bargaining has on unem-
ployment or inflation. This design has the disadvantage of using a measure of la-
bor market performance that is only indirectly affected by wage bargaining. First,
employment is hardly an issue over which employers and employees negotiate,
since hiring and firing is usually an employers’ prerogative (Layard et al.
1991: 91–96). Basically, bargaining concerns wages and working conditions.2 Sec-
ond, although both unemployment and inflation are affected by labor costs, fac-
tors exogenous to the labor market may also influence their level and develop-
ment. For example, government policy may explicitly aim at reducing unem-
ployment (Compston 1997) by various measures ranging from public employ-
ment and active labor market policies, such as training, to encouraging certain
groups of the population to leave the labor market altogether. Similarly, the in-
flationary pressure of wage growth may be mediated by the policy of the central
bank (Hall/Franzese 1998). It follows that the link between wage bargaining in-
stitutions and unemployment is not close enough to convincingly prove the effect
in a quantitative comparative research design. Although intervening factors may
be controlled for, this solution is often impractical in comparative studies because
of the limited number of (independent) observations, limited variation in the cru-
cial explanatory variables, or high degree of collinearity of core variables.3 In the
present paper, the focus is therefore on a variable which is directly affected by
bargaining, i.e., wage growth (see also Traxler/Kittel 2000).
                                                  
2 “Employment pacts” concluded in many European countries in the 1990s may be re-
garded as an exception. However, employers’ concessions in the form of temporarily
refraining from laying off workers, which are often rather weakly formulated, have
often been the only price encompassing unions were able to obtain in return for ac-
cepting wage restraint during that period (see Hassel 2001).
3 The “many-variables (k), small number of observations (N)” problem also plagues
this paper, since the specification that I end up with (Table 3) has a k:N ratio of about
1:7. This implies that the coefficient estimates may lack robustness. However, first, if
we accept the claim that complexity needs to be explicitly modeled, there is little we
can do about this except to wait for additional data. Second, I have experimented
with various model specifications and periods that showed some effect on the coeffi-
cient estimates, in particular for bargaining modes with an exceptionally small num-
ber of observations, but did not alter the general conclusions drawn from the part of
the analysis presented in this paper.
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The second factor that has been neglected in this debate is the effect wage bar-
gaining institutions may have on how the labor market functions. Here, ideas
from the debate in labor economics may fill the gap in political economy (Flana-
gan 1999). If we wish to understand the impact of wage bargaining institutions on
economic performance, we need to know not only how they influence the out-
come, but also whether and how they influence the way in which the outcome is
reached. Much research has recently been focused on the effect of trade union
structure and bargaining coordination on specific intermediate dimensions of the
labor market – notably pay inequality (Rueda/Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein 1999),
labor reallocation (Bertola/Rogerson 1997), labor supply (Nickell/Layard 1997),
and the insider-outsider problem (Lindbeck/Snower 2001). In general, these
studies suggest that these characteristics of the labor market are indeed affected
by institutions. Further, intervening factors, such as various dimensions of the le-
gal framework of the labor market, appear to matter (Nickell 1997). However, I
am not aware of any comparative work that focuses on systematic differences
between institutional settings in the way in which wage growth is determined.
From this perspective, the “parameters” of the labor market refer to aspects such
as effect size, direction, lags, and stickiness. In other words, the term “parameter”
is taken literally in that it is the coefficients in a wage equation that are expected
to differ systematically across bargaining modes.
This study thus attempts to shed some light on the impact of wage bargaining
modes on the effect that “exogenous” economic variables have on wages. Hence
it introduces a core idea from the labor economics debate into comparative politi-
cal economy by developing the proposition that wage bargaining not only affects
performance in the sense of outcome but also in the sense of the parameters of the
labor market. Methodologically, it explores the possibilities of pooled time-series
cross-section analysis for assessing such relationships empirically.
The analysis covers the period 1970–1996 in 20 OECD countries (Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). The endpoints of the series are given by
the availability of data for the bargaining variables that have been collected by the
Internationalisation, Labour Relations, Competitiveness (ILC) project (Traxler et
al. 2001).
The approach taken in this study differs from the ILC project in two respects.
First, in contrast to the ILC project design, which is based on more aggregated pe-
riods covering several years, this analysis explores the underlying annual data.
Second, while the ILC project was concerned with the institutional dimensions of
the labor market and with an analysis of their performance effects, this study fo-
cuses on the effect of wage bargaining on the economic parameters of the labor
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market. This paper therefore attempts to shed some light on the “black box” of
the labor market.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by discussing the basic economic de-
terminants of labor cost developments and the conceptualization of the wage
bargaining modes. This is followed by a section presenting a bargaining mode-
specific labor cost model using the idea of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR) model for comparing the differences in the way labor costs are determined
across bargaining patterns. The findings are discussed and summarized in the
conclusion.
2 Bargaining and Wage Determination: The Analytical Perspective
2.1 Wage Growth and the Two Dimensions of Wage Flexibility
In most OECD countries, wages are not set individually but negotiated collec-
tively between employers and trade unions. In fact, wages are the single most
important issue in collective bargaining (Layard et al. 1991: 91). Hence, if different
bargaining modes have any effect on the labor market at all, they should affect
wage growth. There are several different ways of measuring wage growth. Given
that the ultimate aim of this study is to analyze the impact of labor relations on
the parameters of the labor market, the relevant measure is nominal wages since
this is the object of negotiations between employers and employees (see Traxler/
Kittel 2000).4 A direct measure of aggregate nominal wages would be earnings
per employee, as published by the IMF. Unfortunately, data in this series are
missing for several countries included in this sample.
An alternative is to use a broader concept of wages, i.e., labor costs, which are de-
fined as the total cost incurred by the employer in the employment of labor (In-
ternational Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics). This indicator is avail-
able annually in the OECD Economic Outlook for all sample countries covering
the whole sample period. Although this indicator covers more than pure wages,
notably social security payments, this does not diminish its validity. Particularly
if the state is involved in peak-level negotiations, wage restraint may be traded
against additional social benefits, which tend to put upward pressure on social
security contributions. From an incomes policy perspective, social benefits may
then be regarded as part of the total wage (Flanagan et al. 1983: 670–673; see also
                                                  
4 Real wages would be more interesting if wages are used as some kind of welfare per-
formance indicator, for example.
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Dore, Boyer, and Mars 1994). Labor costs thus include a variety of aspects which
are not the subject of negotiations. However, in line with current practice in mac-
roeconomics (see, e.g., Bean 1994: 577), I shall not deal with this issue in any detail
here in order not to make the model more complicated than necessary. The plau-
sibility of this assumption is empirically strengthened by the fact that the pooled
correlation coefficient between growth rates of labor costs and the available wage
data in the period 1971–1996 is 0.92.
Ultimately, this paper aims to explain the way in which wage growth adjusts to
changes in exogenous variables. This is what is meant by wage flexibility. How-
ever, I contend that wage flexibility is an ambiguous notion because it can be con-
ceptualized in three ways, all represented by specific coefficients in the wage
equation. On the one hand, flexibility is thought of as the speed of adjustment to
external shocks: the faster wage growth adjusts to new conditions in terms of
speed of adaptation and period needed to react, the more flexible it is. On the
other hand, flexibility can also be thought of as the size of the adjustment to ex-
ternal shocks, that is, the amount of wage restraint or wage pressure induced by a
shift in external conditions. In an autoregressive model specification, the coeffi-
cient of the lagged dependent variable represents the “stickiness” of the adjust-
ment process: the higher the coefficient, the more an external effect is spread out
over time. Hence the most flexible adjustment is attained if the autoregressive
component approaches zero. I use the term “adaptability” when referring to this
dimension. The time needed to react to external shocks is represented by the lag
on the effect. In order to stress the speed dimension of flexibility, I call this di-
mension “reactivity.” The third dimension, size of adjustment, is represented by
the coefficient of the exogenous variables in the model. In this dimension, flexi-
bility increases with the deviation of the coefficient from zero. I refer to this di-
mension as “responsiveness.” When referring to more than one dimension at
once, I continue to use the term flexibility or, if more appropriate, its opposite, ri-
gidity. Hence empirically measured wage flexibility increases with a decreasing
autoregressive component, a decrease in the lag length, and an increasing coeffi-
cient of exogenous variables.
2.2 The Economic Determinants of Wage Growth
Wage negotiations between employers and employees are not held in a void but
in an economic environment that influences the strategies and the relative posi-
tions of the bargaining parties. Thus, though economic conditions have an effect
on wages, this effect is mediated by negotiations between mostly corporate actors
– trade unions and employers’ associations. The extent to which this mediation
process influences relationships and outcomes is the main substantive focus of
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this paper. Before reflecting on the bargaining process, it is therefore necessary to
specify a model which represents the economic relationships. Different modes of
wage setting are then discussed.
Macroeconomic wage equations usually make wage increases dependent on ex-
pected price increases, unemployment, and labor productivity, while various
factors that are assumed to influence the mark-up over the reservation wage are
sometimes also included (see, e.g., Bean 1994: 579–581; Blanchard/Katz 1997: 60–
61; Nickell 1998: 806). In most of these accounts, wage equations are not an aim in
themselves, but constitute intermediate steps in a structural model describing
some aspect of macroeconomic performance (notably price inflation or unem-
ployment). I will take a more restricted perspective here in order to keep the
model as simple as possible and will focus on the wage equation, more specifi-
cally on the effect of unemployment changes, price inflation, and productivity
growth on wage growth.5
First, a basic precondition of wage growth is growth of labor productivity. It is
the source of economic prosperity, and growth of aggregate welfare is only possi-
ble if output per worker increases. Since labor productivity growth is the result of
the joint effort of employers (by investing in more productive equipment and
work organization) and employees (by working harder or more efficiently), both
have a reasonable claim for a share in the increase of added value. This implies
that negotiated wages will tend to follow labor productivity, though with a cer-
tain discount and perhaps a certain lag. How fast wages react to productivity
growth may be an issue of debate. Given that nominal wage increases are the re-
sult of bargaining processes, the rationality assumption of both workers and em-
ployers suggests that they take into account both past and expected develop-
ments of productivity. Furthermore, bargaining takes place in advance on the ba-
sis of fairly precise knowledge about productivity growth up until the year before
agreement is reached, some knowledge about current growth, and expectations
about future productivity growth rates based on forecasts and provisional data.
Although it might be argued that current productivity-based wage increases
should depend on last year’s actual productivity growth because wage bargain-
ing is usually conducted in advance, there are several reasons for claiming that
the contemporaneous effect should be most relevant. At the macroeconomic level,
expected productivity growth one year ahead is seldom far off from actually
reached rates, although some deviations can be expected due to random shocks.
Furthermore, wages adapt to actual productivity growth during the validity of a
                                                  
5 It is true that this approach does not capture feedback loops and mutual causation.
However, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper and would need further
exploration.
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wage agreement, e.g., via productivity or profit bonuses. Thus, based on expecta-
tions and ongoing corrections, wage growth should be positively linked to cur-
rent productivity growth. However, this match may only be partial and devia-
tions from expected productivity growth may appear in retrospect. In that case,
either workers will demand their share of additional productivity growth or em-
ployers will insist on a discount in current wage increases to compensate for past
setbacks in productivity growth. Wage growth will be adjusted accordingly, im-
plying that there may also be lagged effects.
Second, wages are related to price increases. Trade unions aim at increasing the
real income of their constituency and therefore include inflation in their wage
demands. The speed of adjustment of prices to wages and wages to prices is an
issue of intense debate. On the one hand, the link is usually conceptualized in
mainstream macroeconomics as wage increases causing immediate price in-
creases. Indeed, prices are more easily adapted to labor costs than vice versa be-
cause they are a firm’s prerogative and are not subject to negotiations. Blanchard
and Katz (1997: 60), for example, estimate a model in which present wages de-
termine present price inflation but are themselves determined by past price infla-
tion and present unemployment. This model seems plausible in the closed econ-
omy context if all firms are equally affected by wage increases. Empirically, it has
been observed that during the early 1970s, “money wages ran significantly ahead
of prices, particularly in the manufacturing sector, where world prices imposed a
ceiling on the extent to which increased labour costs could be passed through into
export prices” (Flanagan et al. 1983: 6). However, whether prices can easily be
adapted to wages in the context of an open economy is less clear if prices are set
on the world market.
On the other hand, other authors stress the importance of non-wage causes of
price inflation (Clegg et al. 1986: 311–318). Given that price inflation is not solely
determined by wage increases but also by monopolistic mark-up pricing in the
goods market, cyclical demand pressure, and random supply shocks, growth of
real wages will be less than nominal wage growth and may be even negative
even though nominal wages rise. In consequence, employees will attempt to
compensate for non-wage inflation not accounted for in the last bargaining
round.6 In some countries, schemes of wage indexation existed during at least
part of the period considered here, e.g., the Italian scala mobile (Regalia/Regini
1998). In other countries, wages were adjusted via renegotiations of agreements
or via wage drift. Thus inflation will be reflected in nominal wage growth. As in
the above discussion with regard to productivity, short-term expected inflation
                                                  
6 However, employers as a group also have an interest in increasing the real income of
the population since producers in OECD member states have to consider negative ef-
fects of falling real wages on their aggregate domestic sales.
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used in wage negotiations will be quite an accurate estimate of actual inflation,
which will be empirically observable in the current effect of inflation on nominal
wage growth. On the other hand, past inflation will influence wage negotiations
too. Due to its incremental nature, the effect of price inflation on real disposable
income is largely hidden (Mitchell 1993) and may thus be spread out over a
longer period. However, the direction of this relationship in the context of wage
bargaining is theoretically unclear. Negotiated wages will have to compensate for
deviations from past expectations. If past inflation was higher than expected, ne-
gotiators may either wish to compensate for real wage losses and demand higher
wage increases or attempt to curb wage increases in order to restrain future infla-
tion. Thus the expected sign of lagged inflation is not determinate. Whether a
strong effect of inflation on wages is advantageous or not is a matter of debate.
On the one hand, it may be indicative of an upward wage-price spiral and hence
a sign of malfunction of the labor market. On the other hand, a failure of wage
growth to adapt to declining inflation rates would give the wage-price spiral new
momentum. Hence an attempt would be made to increase the responsiveness of
wages to inflation. Empirically, this asymmetry in the wage-inflation nexus leaves
the issue indeterminate.
Third, while productivity growth and inflation define the range of possible wage
settlements, unemployment affects the relative bargaining power of the labor
market parties (Layard et al. 1991: 12–31). Hence the causal arrow between wages
and employment not only points from wages to employment, as assumed by
mainstream economics, but also in the opposite direction: “Employees who work
in areas of high unemployment earn less, other things constant, than those who
are surrounded by low unemployment” (Blanchflower/Oswald 1994: 360). In a
longitudinal perspective, it is the change in unemployment which is most rele-
vant: wage restraint will be stronger if unemployment rates are growing, while
declining unemployment rates will increase wage pressure. The model should
thus include changes in unemployment. Next year’s wages are negotiated in the
context of current unemployment dynamics. These directly affect the bargaining
power of workers and their inclination to use their power to the maximum
(Flanagan et al. 1983: 25–29). Given that workers, seen as a collective agent, are
directly affected by unemployment, they will react quickly to changing employ-
ment opportunities when they negotiate wage rates. Thus there is a plausible ar-
gument to be made for a single one-year lag on the effect of unemployment.
However, the lag structure will be determined empirically.
In consequence, without detailing the lag structure, the economic model is
thought to have the following form:
W = ƒ(PTY, INF, UE)
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where W is a measure of the annual growth rate of wages (in other words, wage
inflation), PTY is a measure of the annual growth rate of labor productivity, INF
is the growth rate of the annual consumer price index, and UE is the annual
change in unemployment. Wage growth should be positively related to produc-
tivity and inflation, and inversely to unemployment.7
2.3 Wage Bargaining Modes
During the last two decades, it has become increasingly apparent that the perti-
nent model in conventional economic wisdom, which assumes a free and indi-
vidualized market, does not capture core features of real-world economies. Al-
though this simple model may be a useful heuristic tool to analyze the core eco-
nomic processes in the labor market, real-world labor markets cannot be modeled
as a place where supply and demand of isolated individuals meet; instead, they
are structured by institutions. Given the asymmetric power relations in the labor
market (Offe /Wiesenthal 1985), workers have an incentive to form trade unions
for collective wage bargaining. By bargaining jointly, they are able to obtain
higher wages than they would be able to via individual labor contracts and they
are capable of lobbying in favor of legal rules that increase downward rigidity of
wages.8 For this reason, organized labor markets are said not to respond “flexi-
bly” to economic pressures (Siebert 1997).
Thus, if real-world labor markets diverge from the ideal-type market model due
to the existence of a variety of rigidities, the mode of wage determination is a core
institution of contemporary economies. It not only determines the distribution of
income between labor and capital and among different sections of labor, it also
has consequences for overall macroeconomic performance.
The traditional approach to measuring wage bargaining coordination was devel-
oped by Calmfors and Driffill (1988).9 The main problem of these measures is that
                                                  
7 Like labor costs, the economic explanatory variables are obtained from the OECD
Economic Outlook. Productivity growth is defined as the annual percentage change
in gross volume output (GDP) per employee. Inflation is measured by the annual
percentage change in the consumer price deflator because this is the relevant measure
from the consumers’ or employees’ perspective. Finally, unemployment is measured as
the annual change in the unstandardized unemployment rates published by the OECD.
8 There are other reasons for downward rigidity of wages, which are discussed under
the headings of efficiency wages and implicit contracts (for overviews, see Newbery
and Stiglitz 1987; Bean 1994).
9 For a more elaborate variant of their index, see Iversen (1999). For an overview of
practically all related measurement concepts currently in discussion, see Kenworthy
(2000).
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they conceptually restrict coordination of collective bargaining to a one-
dimensional indicator, i.e., bargaining centralization. With regard to trade union
associations, Moene, Wallerstein, and Hoel (1993: 128) have argued that “[i]f the
way workers are divided into unions matters, then one-dimensional indices of
centralisation are misleading. Countries rank differently along different dimen-
sions of centralisation.” Hence the starting point of the approach developed by
Traxler and Kittel (2000) is a more differentiated view of the wage bargaining
system. They argue that previous concepts neglect the possibility of functional
equivalents to centralized bargaining and fail to reflect the role of the state and
the impact of framework conditions set by labor law. In consequence, they pro-
pose a new conceptualization of collective bargaining as the interplay of coordi-
nation attempts along a horizontal and a vertical dimension. Horizontally, the
problem is how collective agreements are concluded. They distinguish six main
patterns: (1) inter-associational (bipartite) coordination between peak associa-
tions, (2) intra-associational (internal) coordination within peak associations, (3)
state-sponsored (tripartite) coordination between peak associations, (4) pattern
setting by a dominant sector, (5) state-imposed coordination (e.g., a wage freeze),
and (6) no coordination.
Wage coordination across the economy was widespread in OECD countries
throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. However, to the extent that effective
wage restraint presupposes both horizontal and vertical coordination, the ob-
served horizontal coordination patterns represent attempts at coordination initi-
ated from “above” rather than effective coordination. Whether the attempts at
horizontal coordination are effective depends on the extent to which the bar-
gaining systems are governable in terms of vertical coordination.
In the vertical dimension, the problem of encompassing peak associations is how
to make member associations comply with central wage agreements. Internal
means of enforcement are either lacking or useless given the exit possibility of
member organizations. Whether centrally agreed wage restraint does indeed
translate into lower growth rates of labor costs thus depends on the availability of
external conditions. Traxler and Kittel (2000) include two aspects in their measure
which they call bargaining governability: the legal enforceability of collective
agreements, making collective agreements binding for the signatories under labor
law, and the existence of a peace obligation prohibiting industrial action during the
term of a collective agreement. High governability combines legal enforceability
of collective agreements and a peace obligation that is automatically inherent in
any collective agreement. The peace obligation must include the employees’
workplace representatives even if they are established as a body formally inde-
pendent of and separate from the union organization. Low governability lacks
either legal enforceability or the peace obligation.
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Traxler and Kittel (2000) argue that three coordination patterns do not need gov-
ernability to be effective. Horizontal coordination may rely on functional equiva-
lents to bargaining governability. This involves state-enforced coordination when
compliance with wage restraint is authoritatively enforced. Further, the need for
vertical coordination decreases with growing decentralization of bargaining. If
bargaining is uncoordinated horizontally, any vertical coordination becomes
pointless. Lastly, pattern setting needs less vertical coordination than other, more
centralized forms of horizontal coordination because the level of bargaining is al-
ready rather decentralized.
In contrast, bargaining governability is a crucial prerequisite for all coordination
patterns in which central-level peak associations voluntarily assume the main
burden of coordination. Bargaining governability is argued to be superior to both
intra-union and bargaining centralization because it is not simply a hierarchical
mechanism that transmits higher-level wage agreements down to the rank and
file. Instead of imposing substantive agreements, bargaining governability con-
stitutes certain rules of the game that leave the shopfloor as much freedom as is
compatible with higher-level wage coordination. As most of these rules are guar-
anteed by the state, they can be less easily challenged by the shopfloor than the
hierarchical order of union structures and bargaining levels. Voluntary peak-level
coordination includes inter-associational, intra-associational, and state-sponsored
coordination. Traxler and Kittel (2000) show that all forms of voluntary peak-
level coordination were able to moderate wages when combined with high gov-
ernability. By contrast, if voluntary peak-level coordination lacks high govern-
ability, wage growth is significantly above average.
These findings suggest that the 12 categories resulting from cross-classifying the
coordination patterns with bargaining governability can be summarized as five
categories. These will be called bargaining modes in the remainder of the paper: (1)
peak-level coordination with low bargaining governability, (2) peak-level coordi-
nation with high bargaining governability, (3) pattern setting, (4) state-imposed
wage coordination, and (5) uncoordinated bargaining. A classification of the 20
countries into the five categories based on an aggregation over three- to five-year
periods is summarized in the Appendix. The annual data used in the present pa-
per classify the countries according to the year in which the wage agreement con-
cluded by a certain bargaining mode was valid. Hence, depending on the time of
implementation of the contract, the wage rates were either negotiated and con-
cluded in the year before or during the year of classification. These five categories
are used to analyze the differences in the way labor costs are affected by unem-
ployment, inflation, and productivity growth. Formally, the model developed in
Sect. 2.2 is extended to give
W = ƒ(PTY, INF, UE | BM),
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 01/3
where W, PTY, INF, and UE are defined as before and BM refers to the bargaining
modes. The model thus assumes that the effect of the economic variables on wage
growth is conditional on the mode of wage bargaining.
3 An Empirical Assessment of Wage Determination Parameters
3.1 The Economic Model
The standard approach to time-series analysis of stationary variables is to esti-
mate a general Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model (Greene 2000: 724–
733) and to test down the specification. Pretesting the variables for autocorrela-
tion in a pooled time-series cross-section framework yields significant first-order
autocorrelation in all variables and significant second-order effects for inflation
and unemployment changes. Hence, although there is little reason to expect lag
lengths longer than 1 in annual data (Beck/Katz 1996), the starting specification
will contain current values and two lags of all variables.
The issue of nonstationary variables is somewhat more ambiguous. There are
currently no generally accepted methods for pretesting for unit roots in panel
data (see Maddala/Wu 1999; Smith 2000). The Levin and Lin test including one
lagged difference strongly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for both pe-
riod means-corrected data and period and country means-corrected data.10 Run-
ning augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with one lagged difference on the period
means-corrected data for each country separately yields rather strong evidence
against unit roots for the change in unemployment and productivity growth in
most countries. The evidence against unit roots for labor cost growth rates and in-
flation is weaker, with more countries not reaching a τ-value below –3.00 (i.e., the
5 percent critical value for 25 observations). However, Culver and Papell (1997)
reject the unit roots hypothesis for inflation in a similar panel situation, although
they were unable to reject the unit roots hypothesis for the single time series.
Since all variables used here are expressed as annual changes or growth rates,
there is little theoretical reason to suspect that variables are nonstationary. All this
suggests that it seems safe to assume they are stationary.
As Greene (2000: 725) suggests, OLS is the estimator of choice for ARDL models.
In order to take into account panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous cor-
relation, Beck and Katz’ panel-corrected standard errors (Beck/Katz 1995) are
used. An underlying fixed-effects specification with both country- and period-
                                                  
10 The smallest τ-value is –6.28 for inflation in the period means-corrected specification.
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specific effects takes into account both common shocks and general growth dif-
ferences between the countries.
Table 1 presents three versions of the economic model without institutional ef-
fects. Model 1 is a specification with a first-order lag structure on unemployment
and a second-order lag structure on inflation and productivity. Current unem-
ployment, both lags of inflation, and the first lag of productivity turn out to be in-
significant. Only lagged unemployment and a first-order structure on inflation
and productivity are therefore assumed to matter.11 Nevertheless, model 2, which
restricts these coefficients to zero, reveals nonsignificant first-order effects for in-
flation and productivity. As a result, model 3 presents the reference model for the
subsequent institutional model, which, as will become apparent, is based on the
same lag specification. Noteworthy is a moderate autoregressive component
(0.27), an inverse relationship between unemployment and wages, a strong cur-
rent nexus between inflation and wages, and a moderate effect of productivity on
wages. The direction of these relationships is as expected and it is therefore not
necessary to discuss these findings in more detail, because the model simply
serves as a reference specification for the institutional model presented below.
With regard to the fixed country and period effects, all three specifications sug-
gest that the period effects are relevant but the country effects are not. This may
be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, the model might be regarded as
sufficiently well specified to be valid across space, but not across time. Hence it
would be concluded that country averages do not differ. On the other hand, the
size of variation within a country may be too large to allow the country effects to
become significant. Hence a factor should be sought that captures variation
within a country. One candidate would be the bargaining mode, which differs
within countries across time. If the bargaining mode (which groups countries at
different points in time) is relevant, its effect should be significant and leave the
remaining variation to the country effects, which might then become significant.
                                                  
11 Note that the second lag of productivity is significant in this specification. However, I
exclude it here in order to make this model compatible with institutional specifica-
tions presented below where this coefficient is no longer significant. A substantive
interpretation of the statistical significance of this coefficient might suggest a stag-
gered adjustment process in which wages adjust partly to expected and partly to ex-
perienced productivity growth.
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Table 1 The Economic Determinants of Wage Growth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Wt
−
1 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.27***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
UE −0.15 – –
(0.16)
UEt
−
1 −0.35** −0.51*** –0.53***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
INF 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.66***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
INFt
−
1 −0.01 −0.04 –
(0.09) (0.08)
INFt
−
2 −0.03 – –
(0.06)
PTY 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
PTYt
−
1 −0.07 −0.05 –
(0.07) (0.07) –
PTYt
−
2 0.16** – –
(0.07)
F-test Fixed Country Effects 0.64 0.91 0.89
[0.88] [0.58] [0.59]
F-test Fixed Period Effects 3.90*** 5.88*** 6.42***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Adj. R2 0.87 0.87 0.87
SSR 2167.85 2219.23 2224.40
N Estimated Coefficients 54 51 49
N Observations 509 509 509
Notes: Country and Period Effects included; intercept suppressed due to use of full set of
country dummies. Panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) in parentheses.
Dependent variable = Annual growth rates of nominal labor costs.
W = Annual growth rates of nominal labor costs;
UE = annual differences in unemployment;
INF = Annual growth rates of the consumer price index;
PTY= Annual growth rates of volume GDP per employee;
Data source: OECD Economic Outlook, 1999, and previous editions.
*** = significance level 0.01;
** = significance level 0.05;
* = significance level 0.10 (all two-sided tests).
All predictor variables except dummies are overall mean-centered.
Adj. R2 = Regression coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom.
SSR = Sum of Squared Residuals.
F-tests against null-hypothesis that all country/period intercepts are equal; significance
level in square brackets.
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3.2 Bargaining Modes as Intervening Variables
If the parameters of the model are driven by differences in bargaining modes, a
model which estimates bargaining mode-specific coefficients should be able to
capture variation not only in the growth rates of labor costs but also in the model
parameters. Assuming that the impact of the exogenous variables is identical
within one bargaining mode but differs across modes, while the differences be-
tween countries are negligible, it is possible to estimate bargaining mode-specific
autoregressive components and coefficients of exogenous variables. The bar-
gaining modes are thus used to make a statement in substance about the impact
of the economic variables. It is assumed, however, that the impact multiplier – the
autoregressive coefficient – is the same for all exogenous variables. Hence the
starting model has the following form:
where W = nominal labor costs, BM = bargaining mode, UE = unemployment,
INF = consumer price inflation, and PTY = productivity growth. Further, δ, γ1, γ2, β
1–9, φ, and ξ are coefficients, m is a counter of M = 5 bargaining modes, i is a coun-
ter of N = 20 countries, t is a counter of T periods (depending on the number of
lags included), vi refers to the fixed country effects, and wt to the fixed period ef-
fects. This model is inspired by the SUR approach, but differs from the classical
specification by replacing country-specific coefficient estimates by bargaining
mode-specific coefficients. Hence countries are only entered as country-specific
variations in the intercept (φivi). In other words, it is assumed that the bargaining
modes override country effects on the coefficient estimates.12 This implies that an
interpretation of the model with respect to the relative performance of countries
needs to start from the bargaining mode prevailing during a specific period (see
Appendix).
                                                  
12 Strictly speaking, it would be necessary to test the specification used in this paper
against a less restricted specification which includes country-specific coefficient esti-
mates as well. However, the number of coefficients estimated in such a model defi-
nitely exceeds any sensible k:N ratio.
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3.3 Hypotheses
Since the autoregressive component is defined as the discounting factor in the
autocorrelation function, it tells us how much of a change in the exogenous vari-
ables at period t is transmitted to period t+1. In other words, the autoregressive
coefficient refers to the speed of adjustment of labor costs to changing conditions
and can be interpreted as an indicator of adaptability of wage growth. Adapt-
ability of the system becomes higher as the coefficient approaches zero. A coeffi-
cient approaching plus or minus one is indicative of low labor market adaptabil-
ity, whereby positive values indicate a smooth adaptation process and negative
values refer to an oscillating pattern, indicating a more turbulent process. If the
coefficient is equal to or larger than unity, the process is nonstationary, which in-
dicates that labor costs do not return to their long-term equilibrium growth path
after external shocks under the conditions of specific bargaining modes.
Two bargaining modes are clear candidates for high adaptability: uncoordinated
bargaining and pattern setting. Uncoordinated bargaining, which is the closest
real-world approximation to the atomistic labor market, should be able to adapt
instantly to external shocks since trade unions are not expected to be able to im-
pose their wage interests on employers (Calmfors/Driffill 1988). In contrast, pat-
tern setting is a bargaining mode in which the sector with the strongest interests
in world market competitiveness sets the going rate regardless of the feasibility of
higher wage increases in other sectors (Traxler/Kittel 2000). Since the rather de-
centralized nature of coordination which characterizes pattern setting allows for a
large amount of variation in wage increases across the economy, external shocks
should be quickly absorbed.13
The story is different for peak-level coordination. Since central wage agreements
are the result of bargaining processes in which all sectors are involved, it is con-
siderably more difficult, first, to reach an agreement at all and, second, to enforce
the compromise vis-à-vis sectoral or firm-level units (Traxler/Kittel 2000). Lower
adaptability should thus be expected in all forms of central coordination. While in
the case of high governability peak-level coordination only faces the wider coor-
dination problems, central coordination with low governability also has to cope
with lower-level militancy, and wage drift is expected to be higher. Hence, in this
case, the lack of an enforcement mechanism is expected to additionally decrease
adaptability.
This implies the following hypothesis: We should expect the categories repre-
senting uncoordinated bargaining and pattern setting to reach autocorrelation co-
                                                  
13 Note that this proposition runs counter to the expectation of Calmfors-Driffill (1988)
that intermediately centralized bargaining systems should perform less well.
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efficients near zero, to be followed, at some distance, by voluntary peak-level co-
ordination with high bargaining governability. By contrast, the category of peak-
level coordination with low governability should have an autocorrelation coeffi-
cient further away from zero. There are no clear expectations about state-imposed
wage setting: On the one hand, the authoritative imposition of wage levels is the
opposite of the free market and should thus be a case of low adaptability. On the
other hand, the use of state authority is often considered necessary because of the
lack of success of voluntary attempts at coordination. It is designed to bring
down wage increases to a level compatible with economic circumstances (for ex-
amples in the 1970s and 1980s, see Flanagan et al. 1983; Dore, Boyer, and Mars
1994).
In a model specification conditioning wage determination on the bargaining
mode, the hypothesis not only refers to the autoregressive component but also to
the magnitude, size, and lag structure of the other coefficients. The expectation in
this regard is that uncoordinated bargaining and pattern setting should be most
responsive and thus have positive and comparatively large immediate effects
with small autoregressive coefficients and short lag structures. In modes of vol-
untary peak-level coordination with high governability, effects should also be
positive but should exhibit a somewhat slower and more spread-out process of
adaptation, reflected in smaller positive coefficients with a more pronounced lag
structure and higher autoregression indicating a greater degree of labor market
rigidity. In contrast, voluntary peak-level coordination with low governability
should be less able to respond to economic conditions –which should be reflected
in smaller coefficient estimates and longer lag structures. Finally, the effect of
state-imposed coordination is hard to predict. It may be a source of high rigidity,
may disconnect labor costs from external effects, or may cause labor market pa-
rameters to be realigned with macroeconomic requirements.
3.4 Empirical Findings
The starting specification (not reported) does not yield statistically significant ef-
fects for the second lags of the exogenous variables, and the second autoregres-
sive components hardly transcend the 10 percent significance level. In addition,
the F-tests of equality of coefficients across bargaining modes reject bargaining
mode-specific variation in the second lags. This suggests that the lag specification
should be restricted to a single lag for each variable.
As can be seen from Table 2, which presents the model with one lag on each vari-
able, the current values of unemployment and the lagged values of inflation and
productivity growth do not significantly affect labor costs except for a weak asso-
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ciation between unemployment and wages in two bargaining modes. In addition,
the F-tests reported in the last column, which explore whether the five bargaining
mode-specific coefficients can be replaced by a single coefficient for each of the
variables separately, suggest that these variables do not add explanatory power.
From a statistical point of view, these variables should therefore be removed from
the specification.
Table 2 The Impact of Bargaining Modes on Wage Determination, Full Specification
Peak-level
Coor-
dination
Low Gov.
Peak-level
Coor-
dination
High Gov.
Pattern
Setting
State-
imposed
Coordination
Uncoor-
dinated
Bargaining
F-test
Wt
−
1 0.23*** 0.19** −0.00 0.39*** 0.16 2.19*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.17) [0.07]
UE 0.31 −0.47* 0.12 −0.15 −0.26 1.45
(0.27) (0.28) (0.53) (0.34) (0.28) [0.22]
UEt
−
1 −0.32 −0.58* −0.79 −0.52 −0.51* 0.23
(0.27) (0.30) (0.48) (0.36) (0.31) [0.92]
INF 0.76*** 0.65*** 1.04*** 0.50*** 0.52** 3.29**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) [0.01]
INFt
−
1 −0.04 0.09 −0.05 0.02 0.31 0.59
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.24) [0.67]
PTY 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.80*** −0.23* 0.28 9.67***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.27) [0.00]
PTYt
−
1 0.02 0.08 0.03 −0.07 −0.03 0.26
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) [0.91]
BM 10.54 10.42 11.75 10.01 11.51 2.66**
(0.80) (0.71) (0.75) (0.65) (0.55) [0.03]
Adj. R2 0.88 F-test Fixed Country Effects 1.50*
SSR 1837.42 [0.08]
N Estimated Coefficients 84 F-test Fixed Period Effects 6.00***
N Observations 509 [0.00]
Notes: Dependent variable = Annual growth rates of nominal labor costs. BM = Bargaining mode (for defini-
tions see section 2.3 and the Appendix). The full set of bargaining modes replaces the intercept; hence the
coefficient estimates of BM are the estimated (partly counterfactual) average level of nominal wage growth for
the reference year (1971) and the reference country (US). Note that for the interpretation of these coefficient
estimates, one would need to know the size of the country and period effects (not reported here for reasons of
space).
Peak, Low = Peak-level Coordination with Low Bargaining Governability.
Peak, High = Peak-level Coordination with High Bargaining Governability.
F-test: Test against equality of coefficients of a variable across bargaining modes.
See Table 1 for further details.
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Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates of the model resulting from this respecifi-
cation, and Table 4 summarizes the estimated differences between the bargaining
mode-specific coefficients together with the associated significance levels of the t-
tests. The F-tests for the fixed effects provide moderate support for including
country effects, which suggests that the bargaining modes have indeed taken out
some variation within countries (as compared to the purely economic specifica-
tion), and strong support for including period effects. As Table 3 shows, the over-
all F-test against the purely economic specification assuming a common coeffi-
cient for all bargaining modes (Table 1, model 3) is highly significant, suggesting
that conditioning the economic relationships on the bargaining modes does in-
deed improve the explanatory power of the model. Going through Table 3 by
rows reveals the patterns across bargaining modes for each of the explanatory
variables. First, adaptability, represented by the autoregressive coefficient, varies
significantly across most modes, as the F-test for lagged labor costs suggest. As
expected, the coefficient is practically zero in systems based on pattern bargain
ing. The coefficient is about 0.2 for systems with uncoordinated bargaining and
Table 3 Bargaining Modes and Wage Determination, Restricted Specification I
Peak-level
Coor-
dination
Low Gov.
Peak-level
Coor-
dination
High Gov.
Pattern
Setting
State-
imposed
Coordination
Uncoor-
dinated
Bargaining
F-test
Wt
−
1 0.23*** 0.19** −0.01 0.40*** 0.21 4.78***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) [0.00]
UEt
−
1 −0.23 −0.90*** −0.88** −0.59* −0.38* 1.74
(0.25) (0.22) (0.41) (0.32) (0.23) [0.14]
INF 0.73*** 0.70*** 1.01*** 0.50*** 0.68*** 3.74***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) [0.00]
PTY 0.38*** 0.47*** 0.78*** −0.23** 0.25 10.95***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.24) [0.00]
BM 10.37 10.34 11.74 9.88 11.39 2.99**
(0.78) (0.67) (0.72) (0.61) (0.50) [0.02]
Adj. R2 0.88 F-test Fixed Country Effects 1.53*
SSR 1876.27 [0.07]
N Estimated Coefficients 69 F-test Fixed Period Effects 6.17***
N Observations 509 [0.00]
F-test vs. economic model 3.96***
Notes: Dependent variable = Annual growth rates of nominal labor costs.
F-test vs. Economic Model: Comparison of the specification in this Table with model 3 in Table 1.
See Tables 1 and 2 for further details.
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for both modes of central coordination. While the uncoordinated bargaining
mode is not significantly different from zero, both centrally coordinated modes
have a clear effect. Finally, with an autoregressive coefficient of 0.4, inertia is
strongest in cases of state-imposed coordination, indicating that the data fit the
rigidity hypothesis for this bargaining mode best. Hence pattern bargaining
adapts most quickly to external shocks, while in the other modes part of the effect
is carried over to the following years.
Second, the coefficient pattern of unemployment reveals a strong negative impact
for peak-level coordination with high governability and for pattern bargaining,
while the effect is considerably – albeit, as Table 4 shows, not significantly –
smaller in the case of uncoordinated bargaining, state-imposed coordination, and
peak-level coordination with low governability. This indicates that there are two
modes in which the responsiveness of labor costs to unemployment is particu-
larly explicit, while the nexus is weaker for the other categories.
Third, growth rates of labor costs are strongly positively related to inflation in all
bargaining modes – which is not surprising given the fact that the measure used
is nominal – but still reveals some significant variation across the different modes
(see Table 4). The effect is practically one to one for pattern bargaining, strong for
both variants of peak-level coordination and uncoordinated bargaining, but con-
siderably weaker for state-imposed coordination.
Fourth, the responsiveness to productivity growth is particularly high in the case
of pattern bargaining and significantly weaker for the two peak-level coordina-
tion modes, while in the uncoordinated bargaining mode, labor costs hardly
show a noticeable reaction to productivity growth. In state-imposed coordination,
the effect is even significantly negative.
The bargaining mode intercepts must be included in order not to restrict mean
wage growth to make it equal for all bargaining modes. However, since they rep-
resent the effect of the bargaining modes with respect to the reference country
and reference period, their values should not be taken at face value and a discus-
sion here is superfluous.
All in all, these findings suggest that the bargaining modes clearly affect wage
determination. A comparison of the columns in Table 3 reveals the patterns
within the bargaining modes across variables. In contrast to the “neoliberal” as-
sumption that decentralized and deregulated labor markets are most adaptable
and responsive to external shocks, the results indicate that some modes of coor-
dination are superior in this regard. Growth rates of labor costs not only adapt
most quickly to external shocks in the case of pattern bargaining, they also show
the highest responsiveness to unemployment, inflation, and productivity growth.
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Table 4 Comparison of Bargaining Modes
Peak-level
Coordination
High Gov.
Pattern
Setting
State-imposed
Coordination
Uncoordinated
Bargaining
Wt
−
1 Peak-level, Low Gov. 0.04 0.24*** −0.18** 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Peak-level, High Gov. 0.19** −0.22** −0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Pattern Setting −0.41*** −0.21
(0.08) (0.16)
State-imposed Coord. 0.20
(0.16)
UEt
−
1 Peak-level, Low Gov. 0.67** 0.65 0.36 0.15
(0.31) (0.47) (0.39) (0.33)
Peak-level, High Gov. −0.02 −0.31 −0.52*
(0.44) (0.35) (0.29)
Pattern Setting −0.29 −0.50
(0.48) (0.46)
State-imposed Coord. −0.21
(0.38)
INF Peak-level, Low Gov. 0.03 −0.28** 0.23** 0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17)
Peak-level, High Gov. −0.31** 0.20* 0.02
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17)
Pattern Setting 0.50*** 0.33*
(0.12) (0.18)
State-imposed Coord. −0.18
(0.18)
PTY Peak-level, Low Gov. −0.09 −0.40** 0.61*** 0.13
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.27)
Peak-level, High Gov. −0.31** 0.71*** 0.22
(0.14) (0.16) (0.26)
Pattern Setting 1.01*** 0.53**
(0.15) (0.24)
State-imposed Coord. −0.48*
(0.27)
BM Peak-level, Low Gov. 0.03 −1.39* 0.49 −1.02
(0.70) (0.79) (0.59) (0.74)
Peak-level, High Gov. −1.40*** 0.46 −1.05*
(0.49) (0.46) (0.62)
Pattern Setting 1.86*** 0.35
(0.61) (0.73)
State-imposed Coord. −1.51**
(0.61)
Notes: Entries are differences in coefficient estimates between bargaining modes, based on the model pre-
sented in Table 3, standard errors of these differences in parentheses. E.g.:
β(Wt
−
1)peak-level, low gov. − β(Wt
−
1)peak-level, high gov. = 0.23 − 0.19 = 0.04.
See Tables 1 and 2 for further details.
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Since in two of the countries belonging to this category for longer spells of the pe-
riod investigated – Germany and Austria – wage growth is explicitly linked to
productivity growth in the wage negotiations (Jacobi et al. 1998; Traxler 1998),
this finding suggests that these coordination efforts were successful. Performance
of peak-level coordination with high governability is similar, though less explicit.
The immediate responsiveness to unemployment, inflation, and productivity
growth is somewhat smaller, and a small amount of stickiness spreads out the ef-
fect over time.
Still smaller is the immediate responsiveness of labor costs to inflation and pro-
ductivity growth in the case of peak-level coordination with low governability,
while there is no significant effect of unemployment. By contrast, uncoordinated
bargaining reveals a small and only marginally significant effect of unemploy-
ment and a smaller impact of inflation, while productivity growth appears to be
irrelevant. Lastly, state-imposed coordination turns out to be the most rigid and
inconsistent mode in terms of speed of adjustment, with an average effect of un-
employment, the smallest effect of inflation, and a negative effect of productivity
growth. This may be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, the authoritative
imposition of general wage regulations is the opposite of flexibility and adapt-
ability, suggesting that the inconsistency of the coefficient estimates could be
traced back to the rigidity of the system. On the other hand, causality may run
counter to the argument if state authority intervenes in order to moderate wage
pressure after the bargaining parties failed to come to an agreement.
Variation across bargaining modes in long-run solutions – which can be calculated
by β/(1–γ) – is smaller, particularly for the effect of inflation (with estimated long-
run coefficients covering the range 0.83–1.00) and, to a lesser degree, productivity
(covering the range 0.32–0.77).14 This suggests that, particularly for inflation, short-
term responsiveness and reactivity jointly lead to rather similar long-term results: if
reactivity is fast, responsiveness tends to be high and vice versa.
As discussed above, the use of current inflation rates as explanatory variables
might be debatable from a theoretical perspective because, at the time of wage-
fixing, the current inflation rates are unknown and negotiators therefore have to
base their claims on the lagged inflation rates. In order to explore this possibility,
Table 5 presents a second variant of the restricted model which substitutes the
current inflation rates for the lagged ones. Some changes with respect to the
findings from Table 3 are considerable: In the case of pattern setting, the autore-
                                                  
14 Strictly speaking, solving for long-run solutions should take into account the prob-
ability of a country using a particular bargaining mode. This implies the need for a
model for these probabilities which is currently unavailable. I would like to thank
Ron Smith for alerting me to this problem.
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gressive component now becomes significant, while the coefficient of unemploy-
ment becomes insignificant, although it remains in the same order of magnitude.
Further, the impact of lagged inflation is considerably lower than that of current
inflation. Three of the four F-statistics which are significant in Table 3 are insig-
nificant in Table 5. Apart from that, the coefficients are not substantially affected
by the change in specification. However, both the decline in significance of the F-
tests and the now considerably increased sum of squared residuals (from 1876.27
to 2689.85) are evidence of a considerable decline in the overall fit of the model.
For these reasons, I tend to dismiss the model as inferior to the one presented in
Table 3 and conclude that the evidence for a more immediate adjustment of
wages to inflation is stronger.
4 Conclusion
Wage bargaining affects the way wages are determined by unemployment, infla-
tion, and productivity growth. Three dimensions of the wage determination pro-
cess are relevant here: the speed of adjustment, the size of the coefficient, and the
Table 5 Bargaining Modes and Wage Determination, Restricted Specification II
Peak-level
Coordination
Low Gov.
Peak-level
Coordination
High Gov.
Pattern
Setting
State-
imposed
Coordination
Uncoor-
dinated
Bargaining
F-test
Wt
−
1 0.37*** 0.25*** 0.24** 0.42*** 0.20 1.13
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.18) [0.34]
UEt
−
1 −0.48* −1.04*** −0.84 −0.18 −0.70** 1.17
(0.29) (0.25) (0.56) (0.35) (0.31) [0.32]
INFt
−
1 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.34** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.37
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.10) (0.21) [0.83]
PTY 0.11 0.26* 0.61*** −0.34** 0.17 6.88***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.30) [0.00]
Intercept 10.48 10.46 12.11 9.97 11.18 2.15*
(1.02) (0.81) (0.89) (0.76) (0.65) [0.07]
Adj. R2 0.83 F-test Fixed Country Effects 2.14***
SSR 2689.85 [0.08]
N Estimated Coefficients 69 F-test Fixed Period Effects 10.54***
N Observations 509 [0.00]
Notes: Dependent variable = Annual growth rates of nominal labor costs.
See Tables 1 and 2 for further details.
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lag structure. According to the final model, the lag structure is simple. There is no
evidence of distributed lags – a single effect captures all variation that is attribut-
able to these three factors, and no relevant bargaining mode-specific differences
in the lag structure are discernible. Wages respond to shocks in inflation and pro-
ductivity growth within the same year and to shocks in unemployment with a
one-year lag. This difference is consistent with the above reasoning that inflation
and productivity growth are forward-looking elements of wage negotiations and
define the range of possible outcomes, hence the current effect, and that unem-
ployment determines the power of labor at the moment of wage negotiations,
hence the lagged effect.
The size of the coefficient refers to the strength of the effect. In all instances, pat-
tern bargaining and, with a small discount, peak-level coordination with high
governability exhibit the largest impact of unemployment, inflation, and produc-
tivity growth on wage growth. This contrasts with uncoordinated bargaining and
peak-level coordination with low governability. This result can also be explained
within the framework of analysis: both modes with a strong impact are explicitly
designed for economy-wide coordination, and wage deals are geared toward
meeting macroeconomic exigencies, while firm- and sectoral-level or group-
specific wage bargaining is dominant in the other two categories, irrespective of
attempts at central coordination.
The practically immediate response of wages to the economic conditions in the
case of pattern setting confirms the high reactivity and responsiveness of wage
setting in this mode. Uncoordinated bargaining is somewhat more rigid, although
variation is too large to distinguish the coefficient from zero. In contrast, speed of
adjustment is clearly slower in the case of peak-level and state-imposed coordi-
nation, indicating the greater rigidity of these modes.
These results question the neoliberal claim that organized labor markets perform
worse than those unrestricted by regulations and trade union power. At least for
the macroeconomic level, this paper shows that countries with uncoordinated la-
bor markets respond less flexibly to external shocks than those that rely on pat-
tern setting or, to a somewhat lesser degree, on peak-level coordination. In the
latter case, however, the crucial precondition for the ability of a country to reap
the beneficial effects of wage bargaining coordination is the existence of legal
support to enforce central wage agreements. These findings can thus be read as
being supportive of the proposition that not only does wage coordination not
necessarily create excessive rigidity, but that it may even improve the ability of
countries to adapt rather quickly and smoothly to changing economic conditions.
As far as the experience from the period 1971–1996 is concerned, there is therefore
little to be said in favor of dismantling bargaining institutions as a means of im-
proving labor market performance if they have adapted the bargaining mode to
the exigencies of the market.
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Appendix
Bargaining Modes and Bargaining Governability in 20 OECD Countries, 1970–1996,
Summary of Period Averages
1970–73 1974–76 1977–79 1980–82 1983–85 1986–90 1991–93 1994–96
Germany 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
France 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2
Belgium 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4
United Kingdom 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 2 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
Spain – – 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal – 4 4 4 1 1 1 1
United States 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Canada 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
Japan 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Australia 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2
Norway 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2
New Zealand 4 4 4 2 2 2 5 5
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
Finland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Austria 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Notes: Bargaining modes:
1 = peak-level coordination with low governability;
2 = peak-level coordination with high governability;
3 = Pattern setting;
4 = State-imposed coordination;
5 = uncoordinated bargaining;
– = Not applicable.
Modal value of period, based on annual observations.
Source: Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel (2001).
